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Abstract: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is one of the most 
interesting systems for protecting sensitive information nowadays. The 
latest versions of the Java Platform include classes and interfaces making 
ECC available to programmers, but due to the nature of Java it is still 
necessary to employ additional third party packages in order to use 
cryptographic operations and procedures related to ECC. In the present 
work, an extensive review of the most important ECC implementations in 
Java is presented. 
Key words: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Java Platform, ECDSA, ECDH, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Public key cryptography 
Since the development of public key cryptography by Whitfield Diffie and 
Martin Hellman in 1976 [1], several cryptosystems have been proposed. The most 
important features to be requested to a cryptosystem are security and efficiency, 
and in general, both characteristics depend on the mathematical problem on which 
it is based. The list of problems that are considered computationally infeasible to 
solve includes the integer factorization problem (IFP), the discrete logarithm 
problem (DLP), and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).  
In 1985, Victor Miller [2] and Neal Koblitz [3] independently proposed a 
cryptosystem based on elliptic curves, whose security relies on the ECDLP 
problem. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can be applied to data encryption and 
decryption, as well as to the creation and verification of digital signatures. 
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 As in the case of IFP and DLP, no algorithm is known that solves the ECDLP 
in an efficient way. Moreover, the ECDLP is regarded by some authors as the 
hardest of these three problems. Although some operations take more time in the 
ECC system compared to other public key systems, as the key size is smaller in 
ECC, some studies suggest that there are no practical differences in performance 
between ECC and RSA. A comparison among the RSA/DSA/ECC cryptosystems 
and their key lengths is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Key length comparison of RSA/DSA and ECC cryptosystems 
MIPS year RSA/DSA key 
length 
ECC key length Ratio 
10
4 
10
8 
10
11 
10
20 
512 
768 
1024 
2048 
106 
132 
160 
210 
5:1 
6:1 
7:1 
10:1 
 
1.2. Elliptic curve cryptography 
An elliptic curve E over the finite field (or Galois Field) GF is defined by the 
following equation known as a Weierstrass equation [4]:  
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where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6  GF and 0 , being   the discriminant of E that 
can be calculated in the following way [5]: 
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Condition 0  assures the curve is “smooth”, i.e., there are no curve points 
with two or more different tangent lines.  
However, the Weierstrass equation is not used in practice. Instead of it, 
depending on the characteristic of GF and the value of a1, it is possible to work 
with the following simplified equations: 
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Two types of finite fields GF(q) (with q = p
m
 elements) are used in ECC: 
prime finite fields GF(p) (where p is an odd prime and m = 1) and binary finite 
fields GF(2
m
) (where p = 2 and m can be any integer higher than 1). A comparison 
among the bit length of some cryptosystems and the size of the related finite field 
for elliptic curves is shown in Table 2, where |p| represents the bit length of the 
integer p. 
Table 2. Key length according to FIPS 186-2 
Key Length Example Algorithm |p| M 
80
 
112
 
128
 
192 
256
 
SKIPJACK 
Triple-DES 
AES-Small 
AES-Medium 
AES-Large 
192 
224 
256 
384 
521 
163 
233 
283 
409 
571 
1.3. Related standards 
Either in the environment of RSA or ECC, any theoretical finding cannot be 
used directly, as it is necessary to define data structures and procedures to manage 
the information. Currently there are three immediate applications for ECC in 
cryptography, as it is described in next paragraphs. 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
FIPS 186-2 [6] describes all the algorithms and digital signature schemes that 
can be used by any agency of the U.S. government. Currently those algorithms are 
DSA, RSA and ECDSA. ECDSA is the elliptic curve variant of the Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA). 
NIST and ANSI X9.62 state a minimum key size of 1024 bits for RSA and 
DSA and 160 bits for ECC, which provide an equivalent security to a symmetric 
block cipher with a key size of 80 bits. NIST has published a list of recommended 
elliptic curves for protection with different symmetric key sizes (80, 112, 128, 192, 
and 256 bits). In general, ECC over a binary field requires a key size twice that of 
the corresponding symmetric key. ECDSA scheme is also included in IEEE 1363 
and SEC 1 standards. 
As a comparison, texts signed with a 1024 bits RSA key produce a digital 
signature of 128 bytes, whilst the same text signed with a 192 bits ECDSA key 
generates a digital signature of 48 bytes. 
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme 
The most extended encryption/decryption scheme based on ECC is ECIES  
[7], being a variant of the ElGamal scheme. ECIES can be found at ANSI X9.63, 
IEEE 1363a and SEC 1 [8] standards.  
ISO/IEC 18033-2 [9] includes an enhanced version identified as ECIES-KEM, 
which includes modifications in order to prevent “benign malleability” issues. 
As an example, a symmetric key encrypted with a 1024 bits RSA key produces 
an output of 128 bytes compared with the output of 84 bytes if the encryption is 
performed with ECIES. 
 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
The main objective of key exchange protocols is to put in contact two or more 
entities communicating through an open and insecure channel, sharing a secret key 
that will provide data confidentiality and integrity to any information exchanged.  
ECDH denotes the generic key exchange scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman 
mechanism applied to elliptic curves. Some practical implementations can be found 
at ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363, NIST SP 800-56A and SEC 1 documents. 
1.4. Commercial adoption 
On February 16th 2005, the NSA (National Security Agency) announced that 
it had decided to adopt ECC as part of a U.S. government standard in order to 
improve the secure management of sensitive-but-unclassified information. The 
NSA has recommended a group of algorithms called Suite B, including ECMQV, 
ECDH, and ECDSA.  
2. PROBLEM  DEFINITION 
Since its appearance in the mid-1990s, the Java language has experienced a 
constant growth regarding the number of programmers and commercial 
deployments, being massively used in web and corporate applications. As a result 
of its continuous evolution, several versions targeting specific platforms have 
appeared: Java Platform Standard Edition (Java SE) for desktop computers, Java 
Platform Enterprise Edition (Java EE) for advanced servers, Java Platform Micro 
Edition (Java ME) for handsets and PDAs and Java Card (JC) for smart cards. 
Regarding Java SE, as the naming syntax has changed during the last years, its 
version history is included hereafter in order to avoid mistakes when referencing 
the proper version: 
 JDK 1.0 (1996)  J2SE 1.4 (2002) 
 JDK 1.1 (1997)  J2SE 5.0 (2004) 
 J2SE 1.2 (1998)  Java SE 6 (2006) 
 J2SE 1.3 (2000)  
 
In the Java architecture, the Security API (built around the java.security 
package) is one of the most important interfaces of the language. The first version 
of the Security API for the JDK (Java Development Kit) 1.1 introduced the Java 
Cryptography Architecture (JCA), which allows the management of digital 
signatures and message digests.  
In the following versions, Java SE extended the JCA functionality, including a 
provider architecture which allows multiple and interoperable cryptographic 
implementations. More specifically, Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) provides 
implementations for MAC algorithms and for encryption, key agreement and key 
generation methods. JCE was originally an optional package, but since J2SE 1.4 it 
is included in the core Java SE distribution. Algorithm independence is achieved 
by means of specific “engines” or cryptographic services that implement the 
security functionality.  
Before J2SE 5.0, the JCA/JCE environment did not include specific classes for 
ECC. Users willing to use those algorithms were forced to use software from third 
parties that was not compatible with software from other vendors. From J2SE 5.0 
release onwards, some classes and interfaces have been included in order to 
facilitate a standard ECC support. Those additions can be found at the java.security 
package. However, it is still necessary to use third party engines in order to access 
all the power that ECC can provide to Java applications. Therefore, the main 
problem now consists in selecting the proper third party module. 
3. PROBLEM  SOLUTION 
There are several libraries and cryptographic modules in the market that can be 
used for the development of cryptosystems. Due to native code performance, most 
of the implementations are developed in C/C++ or directly in assembly language. 
However, as far as the aim of this paper is to review the state of the art of current 
(i.e. not abandoned projects) ECC implementations using the Java language, we 
will focus in two libraries: Bouncy Castle and IAIK. 
3.1. Bouncy Castle 
Legion of the Bouncy Castle, a group of volunteers and cryptography 
enthusiasts, has developed several Java implementations. Its latest release (1.43) 
includes a lightweight cryptographic API for Java and C#, a provider for the JCE 
and JCA, a clean room implementation of the JCE 1.2.1, a library for reading and 
writing encoded ASN.1 objects, and different generators/processors for X.509 
certificates, S/MIME and CMS, OpenPGP, etc. The lightweight API is a vendor-
specific set of APIs that implement all the underlying cryptographic algorithms, 
and it is intended to be used in memory constrained devices or when easy access to 
the JCE libraries is not possible. 
Regarding ECC, Bouncy Castle  supports both  ECDSA and  ECDH, creation 
of ECDSA certificate requests, encoding of public and private keys in accordance 
with SEC 1 and  a draft implementation of ECIES. As a drawback, this version still 
does not include the ECIES-KEM variant. Two versions of key agreement 
protocols using ECC are supported, standard Diffie-Hellman key agreement and 
standard key agreement with co-factors. 
The BouncyCastle package org.bouncycastle.math.ec consists of the following 
four classes: 
1. The class ECConstants, which provides the numbers 0 to 4 as BigIntegers. 
2. The abstract class ECCurve, which represents an elliptic curve in the 
Weierstrass normal form. 
3. The abstract class ECFieldElements, which represents an element in the 
Galois field that is used. 
4. The abstract class ECPoint, which represents the points on the elliptic 
curve and implements the arithmetic of this curve. 
All the abstract classes are implemented by two subclasses derived from them, 
Fp and F2m, representing curves defined over GF(p) (p > 2) and over fields of 
characteristic 2, respectively. 
 At the beginning of 2008 a study was made public [10] exposing a 
vulnerability in the implementation of the ECPoint class, which could be used in 
real attacks, for example against the ECIES scheme. It must be noted that this 
vulnerability was solved in Bouncy Castle v 1.33, being the open review process 
one of the benefits of open source. 
The reader can find an example of signature creation and verification using the 
Bouncy Castle ECC library at http://www.bouncycastle.org. 
Evaluating the level of support both in terms of encryption and signature 
operations and of supported programming platforms, and given its continuous 
evolution, Bouncy Castle is one of the best cryptographic packages developed as 
open source, not only for ECC but also for other algorithms as RSA, AES, etc. 
3.2. IAIK 
The Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications of the 
Graz University has developed a set of cryptographic tools based on Java. Among 
those tools are IAIK-JCE (main module including RSA, DES, AES, Blowfish and 
other algorithms), IAIK-iSaSiLk (TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 implementations) and 
IAIK-ECC, to name only a few. 
Release 2.18 of the IAIK Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Library, 
available since December 2008, presents the following features: 
 It is compliant with ANSI X9.62 and IEEE 1363 standards. 
 It allows creating and verifying ECDSA signatures and supports the ECDH 
key agreement scheme. 
 ECDSA with SHA-2 support according to ANSI X9.62:2005 and BSI TR-
03111 v1.0. 
 Arithmetic over prime and binary finite fields. The prime field arithmetic is 
based on the BigInteger class. 
 The binary field arithmetic uses polynomial base representation and includes 
a very generic implementation of the field operations.  
 Elliptic curve arithmetic with affine and projective coordinates.  
 ECDSA integration into the JCE/JCA architecture.  
 ECDH/ECDSA integration into the JCE/JCA architecture with and without 
cofactor multiplication.  
 ASN.1 encoding of signatures, public and private keys for usage with X.509 
and PKCS#8. 
Examples of a simple ECDSA signature and the ECDH protocol using the 
IAIK-ECC library can be found at http://jce.iaik.tugraz.at.  
The IAIK-ECC library allows several customization options: 
 Pre-computation of points: It is possible to first pre-compute and store a 
number of points to improve further key pair and signature generations. Pre-
computation has no influence on signature verification and should be used if many 
key pairs or signature generations are performed on a given curve. By default no 
pre-computation is used. 
 Encoding: The standards offer two variants on how to encode domain 
parameters. It is possible either to specify the object identifier OID (if it exists) or 
encode the parameters explicitly. IAIK’s ECC library supports both methods, but 
the default setting encodes the parameters explicitly. 
 Point verification: If a certificate or any other ASN.1 encoded public key is 
parsed, the default implementation can optionally check if the decoded point is on 
the elliptic curve.  
Evaluation and beta versions of the IAIK software can be downloaded, which 
makes it another good option for the development of cryptographic Java 
applications. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The main conclusions derived from the previous report can be summarized as 
follows: 
 During the last years, Java has been one of the technologies with a 
fastest growth. Cryptographic capabilities were added first to the Java SE platform 
and then extended to other platforms such as Java Card. 
 In Java SE, it is possible to use ECC implementations adapted to the 
JCA/JCE framework from version 5.0. However, it is also possible to use 
lightweight APIs provided by different suppliers, which can be a good option if the 
developer must work with Java SE versions prior to the 5.0 release. 
 Among the independent implementations developed outside the Java 
standardization bodies, Bouncy Castle and IAIK outstand above the rest.  
 Both of them provide high quality implementations and can be used not 
only in ECC applications but also in other types of cryptographic deployments. 
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